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“Yesterday’s soldiers of war can become tomorrow’s soldiers of peace…they too should 
be given the opportunity to engage in the process of peace.” 






Reconciliation, one told me, “is to throw away the land of the past, to forsake the 
hate that we have.”2 “It is a friendship,” said another, “If I don’t have it, I can’t break the 
silence that I carry.”3  The poetry of these words astonished me. Both quotes were of 
women ex-combatants, one had fought for the Resistencia and the other for the 
Sandinistas during the dreadful Contra War that beleaguered Nicaragua for much of the 
1980s.  Today, these women are fellow Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo, colleagues in a 
network of war veterans and community leaders working together to nurture structural 
and cultural peace within a nation that remains plagued by social injustice.   
Founded in 1993, La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo4 began as a group 
of demobilized Sandinista and Resistencia soldiers who, acutely familiar with the horrors 
of war, hoped to cultivate a sustainable reconciliation within Nicaragua’s polarized post-
conflict society.  “War, for us, isn’t a job that you start and then forget, but rather 
something that carries pain and greater resentment,” one Promotor explained.5  Fifteen 
years after the armed conflict’s official end, “the war on poverty, the war on hunger” 
remain enduring forms of violence that currently threaten Nicaragua’s precarious peace.6 
This project explores the Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo, documenting their 
                                                 
1 Education and Action for Peace Program, Demobilized Soldiers Speak: Reintegration and Reconciliation 
in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique.  Managua: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1996.  iii. 
2 María Luz Centeno Herrera.  Interview. 21 April 2006.. 
3 Teresa de Jesús Lopez.  Interview. 1 May 2006 
4 The Network of Peace and Development Promoters 
5 Uriel Antonio Carazo García.  Interview.  1 May 2006. 
6 Ibid. 
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transformation from soldiers of war to soldiers of peace and their current struggle against 




MOTIVATIONS AND METHODS 
 
 While I lived and worked in Phnom Penh, Cambodia last summer, the country’s 
violent past haunted me.  The legacy of war there, though never openly acknowledged, 
permeated nearly every facet of Cambodian society.  An International Peace Studies 
major, it was only until I had spent time in Cambodia that I truly began to understand the 
very lasting consequences of war.  Increasingly aware of how ignorant America, so often 
the wager of war, was of this reality, my interest in post-conflict societies grew.  I 
decided to study abroad in Nicaragua with the School for International Training the 
following spring with the hopes of learning how that country and its people had 
reconciled its own difficult past. 
 During my time there, I quickly recognized Nicaragua’s war wounds to be buried 
far deeper than those of Cambodia.  Although social divisions in Nicaragua remained 
apparent, I found myself often forgetting that the country had experienced a civil war just 
fifteen years ago.  While Nicaragua made few attempts to hide this history, it, at the same 
time, did not personally share itself easily.  Had Nicaragua moved on or did it continue to 
suffer in silence?  Had reconciliation between the top translated into reconciliation 
between the bottom? 
 It was with such questions that I first met my independent study advisor, 
Zoilamérica Narváez and, subsequently, La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo. 
Fascinated by the history of the organization and the innovative reconciliation model that 
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it presented, the ex-combatants of its ranks soon become the subjects of my research.  I 
wanted to meet the members of the Red and learn of their personal transformations from 
soldiers of war to soldiers of peace, reconciliados a reconciliadores.7  Moreover, fifteen 
years following the conclusion of the armed conflict, I wanted to hear their perceptions of 
Nicaragua today.  Had the country achieved popular reconciliation?  Was its peace 
sustainable?  How did they, as Promoters of Peace and Development, envision their work 
within Nicaragua’s current socioeconomic situation?   
 During the first week of my research, I conducted a mini-directed readings with 
Zoilamérica.  Besides freshening up on basic peacebuilding theory, I needed to come to 
understand reconciliation within a Nicaraguan reality – what did reconciliation within 
this Nica context look like?  And how did the model fostered and exemplified by the Red 
de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo challenge convention? 
 After gaining this theoretical and historical background, I left Managua for the 
Northern city of Condega where I spent two nights (April 20-21) living with Ramón 
Padilla and his wife, María Luz Centeno.  Both Promotores, Ramón and María Luz had 
fought on opposite sides of the war.  Now the parents of six children, they proved to be 
living examples of popular reconciliation.  Interviewing them both formally and 
informally about their experience within the Red, I also observed their daily life as 
Promotores and enemies reconciled. 
 After returning to Managua for a few days, I reunited with another Promotora, 
Doña Teresa Moreno in Estelí on April 29th.  Hoping to learn more about the workings 
of the modern day network, Doña Tere introduced me to other Promotores and 
community leaders within her barrio.  Traveling with me to Somoto on May 1st, through 
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Doña Tere, I came to meet other members of the Red working around the department of 
Madriz as well. Thus, my research in Estelí and Somoto, similar to that of Condega, 
consisted of observations as well as formal and informal interviews. 
 Returning to the capital on May 2, I formally interviewed one final Promotor on 
May 3rd at the Centro de Estudios Internacionales in Managua.  What follows is the 
culmination of my research.  Although I endeavored to remain as faithful to my subject’s 
words as possible, I fear that no translation can do justice to the beauty and sincerity with 
which much of their words were delivered. 
 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
The Reality of War 
 
 After the triumph of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) on July 19, 
1979, the Nicaraguan population grew increasingly divided over the political, economic 
and social transformations that followed.  This growing internal rift, amplified by the 
concurrent schism between the East and West, eventually erupted into a massive armed 
conflict.  “Politically and ideologically split both for, and against, the Sandinista project”, 
the emerging parties began to organize and promote themselves with the strength and 
encouragement of their international counterparts.8  Fighting in defense of the revolution 
and the sovereignty of Nicaragua, the state’s forces, the Ejército Popular Sandinista 
(EPS)9  were opposed by an irregular army of counterrevolutionaries, called the 
                                                 
8 Agurto, Carlos García, et al. “From War to Demobilization in Nicaragua.”  Demobilized Soldiers Speak:
 Reintegration and Reconciliaiton in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique.  Managua: Centro 
  de Estudios Internacionales, 1996. 10. 
9 Sandinista Popular Army 
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Resistencia Nicaragüense (RN)10  that rejected the Sandinista’s reforms as 
discriminatory, oppressive and inherently unnatural.   
As the war between these two parties escalated, however, the origins of 
Nicaragua’s polarization became overshadowed by the global implications of the national 
conflict.  With the Socialist Bloc offering military and technical support to the Sandinista 
Popular Army and the United States government financing and training the Contra 
insurgency, Nicaragua was soon the battlefield of superpowers.  The country’s 
impoverished campesino population, however, found themselves caught in the resulting 
crossfire. 
At the war’s height, the Sandinista government was allotting half of its national 
budget to its armed forces.11  The Sandinista Popular Army, thus, found itself in the 
position of defending a revolutionary program that lacked the financial resources to 
implement its social agenda.  Consequently, the great majority of soldiers within the 
army, namely the rural and urban poor, reaped little benefit from the cause for which they 
fought.   
Many members of the Resistencia encountered a similar predicament.  Converted 
into the pawns of America’s low intensity strategy, the Contra forces, largely 
campesinos, became the enforcers of a foreign policy that cared little about their way of 
life.    Alejandro Bendaña writes,  
The campesinado was, at the same time, the subject and object 
of the armed and fratricidal confrontation, but it was not he who 
provoked it.  The authors were others, in Washington, who…put 
into execution a global plan to bring Sandinismo to an end, a 
                                                 
10 Nicaraguan Resistance 
11 Edwards, Brett Ashley.  “Broken Promises: The Difficulties with the Demobilization and Reintegration 
 Process in Nicaragua.”  SIT-Nicaragua, Spring 2004.  8. 
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plan that… answered to the Anti-Soviet policies of the American 
Administration.12
 
Knowing little about Communism or why they ought to oppose it, many Contra 
fighters joined the Resistencia more out of fear than personal conviction.  Using 
intimidation to garner recruits, during the course of my research I met one Resistencia ex-
combatant who had been kidnapped by the Contra, taken to the mountains and forced to 
fight.13   That being said, I met another who joined voluntary in order to protect the rights 
that he believed the Sandinista government was denying the Nicaraguan people.14   
With the Sandinista government requiring two years of military service of all men 
aged sixteen, the Sandinista Popular Army, in the same vain, also came to be composed 
of those who defended the Revolutionary cause and those who simply fought because 
that was the law. Of the Sandinista ex-combatants that I interviewed, one claimed to still 
be proud of his military service, describing revolution as “an experience that one lives, 
one learns and one loves.” 15  Another, though, admitted quite honestly that “here there 
was a war between Nicaraguans, between brothers, that wasn’t worth the pain.”16  The 
nation’s conflict, thus, emerged as “a campesino civil war, between the poor of the city 
and the poor of the countryside” who, no matter their own personal loyalties, came to be 
abandoned by the causes they fought to defend.17   
 
                                                 
12 Ortega, Zoilamérica.  Desmovilizados de guerra en la construccíon de la paz en Nicaragua.  Managua:  
Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1996. 1. 
13 Herrera.  Interview.  21 April 2006. 
14 Santos Yader González Romero.  Interview.  3 May 2006. 
15 García. Interview. 1 May 2006. 
16 Isaias Ramírez.  Interview.  30 April 2006. 
17 Ortega, 2. 
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The Road Towards Demobilization 
 Although it did not begin to negotiate with the Nicaraguan Resistance until 1988, 
the Sandinista Government became involved in the international peace process long 
before.  Beginning in 1983, the Sandinista government interacted first with the Contadora 
Group (Mexico, Panama, Columbia and Venezuela) in their initiatives to prevent the 
spread of war in Central America.  Contadora was followed by the Costa Rican 
sponsored Esquipulas Accords of 1986 and 1987 which, like their predecessor, also fell 
through.   
With its economy in shambles and its population socially traumatized, the 
Sandinista government eventually decided to forego regional peace efforts and 
commence bilateral talks with the Nicaraguan Resistance in 1988.  Resulting in the Sapoá 
Agreements, the Sandinistas promised to accelerate the approaching national elections 
and extend political and economic concessions to the opposition.  With the Cold War 
fizzling after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States government ceased its funding 
of the Nicaraguan Resistance the following year.   
After the presidential victory of Doña Violeta Chamorro in 1990, plans were 
reached to sharply reduce the size of the Sandinista police and armed forces and 
completely demobilize the Nicaraguan Resistance, under the auspices of the United 
Nations and Organization of American States.  An agreement made between military 
chiefs of the Sandinista and Resistance armies on April 18, 1990 clarified the roles of 
these international entities, guaranteed “territorial safety zones and security” for 
demobilized members of the Resistance and, finally, established a definitive cease-fire.  
 8
The Resistance, however, remained hesitant to disarm until the Managua 
Declaration was made on May 4, 1990.  In addition to reiterating previous commitments, 
the Managua Declaration included provisions that ensured the political and social 
reintegration of Resistencia ex-combatants, promising to establish specified Poles of 
Development that would facilitate this resettlement process.  Not creating concrete 
policies to execute these proposals, however, many members of the Nicaraguan 
Resistance demobilized to find that the social services promised to them never 
materialized. 
The Managua Declaration also restated the government’s intention to reduce the 
size of the state’s armed and security forces, which it did in three main stages between 
the years of 1990 and 1993.  With the Sandinista Popular Army’s officers and permanent 
members receiving retirement packages depending on their rank and date of discharge, 
the conscripted and Reserve forces collected little benefits.  The discharged security 
forces of the Ministry of the Interior, later the Ministry of Government, found themselves 
in a similar position.  Although most had completed military functions, these retirees 
were still nominally civilians and, therefore, largely ignored in demobilization 
negotiations.   
 
The Challenges of Reintegration 
 Transitioning into civilian life proved exceptionally difficult for Sandinista and 
Resistencia ex-combatants because the Chamorro administration failed to live up to its 
end of the demobilization bargain.  After turning in their weapons, most desmovilizados 
found themselves without the economic and social programs that had been assured to 
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them.  One recalled, “there was always rhetoric about programs…but most never 
materialized.”18  “Free from the constraints of the old East-West division but not from the 
consequences of the North-South divide,” ex-combatants, in their struggle to integrate 
into civil society, therefore, were left to fend for themselves.19   
 As their frustrations with the Chamorro administration mounted, groups of 
desmovilizados from both sides decided to rearm.  “Demanding minimal social benefits 
and a chance to have a dignified livelihood,” these individuals fought for land allocation, 
jobs, health care and housing, much of which had already been promised by the 
government.20  One Promotor remembered,  
There was the Recontra, there was the Recampa…there were 
deaths on one side and there were deaths on the other…there was 
a necessity.  The Resistance demobilized, the Army demobilized, 
but what did they [the government] do for them?  Nothing.21   
 
Emphasizing the failures of Nicaragua’s reintegration strategy, “as soldiers they felt that 
this was the only way they could get the government’s attention and compliance."22   
 
Appreciating the Complexities of Peace 
 Following demobilization, “there was no coherency between fiscal policies, 
policies of development and policies of peace.”23  Assuming that reintegration would 
stem from economic growth, the government’s structural adjustment reforms and 
                                                 
18 Merlo, Genaro Perez.  “The Reintegration Process of the Nicaraguan Resistance.”  Demobilized Soldiers 
Speak: Reintegration and Reconciliation in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique. Managua: 
Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1995. 17. 
19 Bendaña, Alejandro. “Demobilized Soldiers in the Construction of Peace.” Demobilized Soldiers 
 Speak: Reintegration and Reconciliation in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique Pg. 3. 
20 Cortez, Bolívar Téllez.  “The Reintegration of Soldiers of the Sandinista Popular Army.” Demobilized 
Soldiers Speak: Reintegration and Reconciliaiton in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique. 
Managua: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1995. 27. 
21 Teresa Moreno.  Interview.  30 April 2006. 
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subsequent reductions of social spending and services, only drove the country into further 
conflict.24  The nation’s rearmament phenomenon, thus, demonstrates that 
…demobilization is not synonymous with reintegration any more 
than the absence of war means peace.  More sacrifices are 
demanded in the post-war period, which is not a “post-conflict” 
setting, but rather a stage characterized by complex and 
prolonged processes of social, economic and psychological 
reconstruction.25
 
The great flaw of Nicaragua’s reintegration process, therefore, proved to be the 
government’s narrow vision of violence and consequent disregard for the complexities of 
peace.   
Because violence cannot be separated from its structural and cultural components, 
peacebuilding must attend not only to the immediate conflict at hand, but also to the 
institutional and societal roots of such conflict.26  Nicaragua’s official peace process, 
however, endeavored to do no such thing. Doing little more than confiscating the 
weapons of the warring parties, the Chamorro government failed to address the economic 
or social origins of the Contra War.  Following the demobilization, such societal rifts and 
economic disparities endured as a result.  That it to say, although the war had ended, 
examples of cultural and structural violence still thrived.  There existed, “a great poverty 
in all sectors…a lack of medicine, of food.”27 Nicaragua was “a divided family.”28    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Cortez,. 26. 
23 Ortega, 18 
24 Cortez, 26. 
25 Bendaña, 3. 
26 Galtung, Johan.  “Cultural Violence.” Violence and its Alternatives: A Disciplinary Reader. D. Manfred 
B. Steger and Nancy S. Lind.  NY, NY; St. Martin’s Press, 1999.  41 
27 Ramón Padilla. Interview. 21 April 2006. 
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LA RED DE PROMOTORES DE PAZ Y DESARROLLO 
The Beginnings 
 To respond to such conditions, one Promotor told me, “in order to survive we had 
to fight, but not with arms, on behalf of our families, our communities, our society.”29   
With ex-combatants from both sides equally struggling, Resistencia and Sandinista 
desmovilizados decided to demand that their needs be met, “better as brothers than 
apart.”30  And so, in 1994, the Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo came to be born.   
 It is imperative to note that, at such beginnings, the Sandinista and Resistencia 
veterans did not seek or even hope to reconcile with their enemy. Their decision to 
collaborate was strictly a strategic one – working together to address the problems of 
reintegration would grant the desmovilizados a stronger negotiating position with the 
Chamorro government.31   
Although their cooperation was a matter of necessity, the animosity between 
Sandinista and Resistencia ex-combatants remained high.  As one Promotor told quite 
frankly, “To join together with someone who shot bullets at you is a difficult thing!”32 
During the first few meetings between the desmovilizados of the Army and the 
Resistance, another Promotor remembered, “each of us carried our pistol, each of us 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 Romero.  Interview.  3 May 2006. 
29 Herrera.  Interview.  21 April 2006. 
30 Padilla.  Interview.  21 April 2006. 
31 Ortega, 42. 
32 Padilla.  Interview.  21 April 2006. 
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carried our backpack…everyone stayed with their side.”  “All of the wounds were still 
open,” he explained.33   
We had a violent attitude.  When we arrived at discussions with 
the state, like the government of Doña Violeta de Chamorro, we 
did not come to offer suggestions or to chat.  Rather, we arrived 
with a military attitude, a military character, the Contra…just as 
much as the members of the Army.  We told them, “This, I don’t 
like this!”…We didn’t come to say hi to her.  No. “We have a 
network”… [we said]… “And we don’t like that you’re not 
supporting us…Uphold the law because we don’t want to have to 
make use of other means.  The truth is, that was our attitude at 
the beginning of the program.34
 
 As she began working with members of the Resistencia, one of the Promotores 
that I interviewed recalled the rancor that she still carried.  Having lost a brother during 
the war, she couldn’t help but question if she was now collaborating with the person that 
had killed him.  At the same time, however, when she met disabled Contra veterans, she 
found herself wondering whether she, herself, had been responsible for their injuries.35  
 As their cooperation continued, the desmovilizados of the Red began to re-
encounter each other as colleagues rather than enemies.  “We were the same 
Nicaraguans, the same pobres,” one Promotor told me, “The problems of health, of 
education, of unemployment [affected] one just as much as the other.”36  Working 
together to address such issues, “we were generating confianza, moving closer together, 
losing our fear.” 37  The hostilities that had existed before began to fade and there 
emerged, in its place, a common commitment to work for social change.   
I, with pain, gave birth to my son and lost him.  You, with pain, 
gave birth to your son and lost him…all for a land called 
                                                 
33 García.  Interview.  1 May 2006. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Moreno.  Interview.  30 April 2006. 
36 García.  Interview.  1 May 2006. 
37 Ibid. 
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Nicaragua.  Why are we going to continue killing ourselves 
psychologically?38
 
Over and over, Promotores would tell me, “Eramos los mismos Nicaragüenses, we were 
the same Nicaraguans.”   
 
Becoming Agents of Peace 
 During this time, many desmovilizados began to attend workshops sponsored by 
the Programa de Educación y Acción para la Paz,39, the initiative of a local 
nongovernmental organization, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, of which 
Zoilamérica Narváez is now the director.40  Endeavoring to equip ex-combatants with 
skills that would help them in their government lobbying efforts, the program offered 
capacitation sessions about “the reconciliation of conflicts, the mediation of conflicts, 
community development, personal development…the ethics of nonviolence, self 
esteem.”41  According to one Promotor, “this is what brought us to transform ourselves, 
this type of sharing, this type of attitude.”42
 Yet although the members of the Red had begun to reconcile amongst themselves, 
there still existed “hate, distrust and insecurity” within society at large.43  Thus, there 
developed within the members of the Red a desire to set the example “for society, for the 
community and for our own government and political parties” that popular reconciliation 
was feasible.  They were “a group of people that began to join together and understand 
                                                 
38 Moreno.  Interview.  30 April 2006. 
39 Education and Action for Peace Program 
40 Center for International Studies 




each other,” and then, “carry that message to the communities.”44 One Promotor 
explained, “We reconciled ourselves and had to help others reconcile themselves.”45  
In this vain, the Promotores established Escuelas Comunitarias de la 
Construcción de Paz46 in 1997.  At these community peacebuilding institutions, the 
desmovilizados imparted the lessons that they had learned during their own experience 
with the Red.  Besides contributing to the cause of popular reconciliation and 
development, these schools also facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants within their 
own communities.47  Converting from community outcasts to community leaders, 
Promotores were soon called on to mediate local conflicts such as land disputes or 
incidents of domestic violence. One Promotora recalled, “Instead of being guerrilleros, 
we were pacificadores...before we were organized for the war and now for the peace.”48 
“In all areas where there was war, there were Promotores.”49  With the establishment of 
Escuelas Comunitarias de la Construcción de Paz, the membership of the Red multiplied, 
growing to include parents, teachers, students, local authorities - anyone and everyone 
who was interested in contributing to the peace and development of the community. 
 
Flexibility and Foresight 
Today, these schools have been integrated into the organization’s latest initiative, 
The Community Conflict Monitoring System.  It is through this effort that the Red 
endeavors to be preventive rather than reactionary, attempting to keep up to date with the 
                                                 
44 García.  Interview.  1 May 2006. 
45 Romero.  Interview.  3 May 2006. 
46 Community Schools of the Construction of Peace 
47 Programa de Educación y Acción para la Paz.  1991-2000: Nueve años aportando a la construcción de la 
Paz en Nicaragua.  Managua: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 2000. 17. 
48 Moreno.  Interview.  30 April, 2006. 
49 Padilla.  Interview.  21 April 2006. 
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current concerns of their fellow community members and identify future sources of 
conflict.  Conducting biannual surveys, members of the Red begin by polling their 
neighbors about everything from CAFTA to health care, the cost of transportation to the 
frequency of domestic violence.  Besides sharing this information with local authorities 
and other nongovernmental organizations, the members of the Red also design and give 
community workshops that respond to the issues presented.  It is in this manner that the 
Red stays flexible, corresponding its efforts to the changing needs of individual 
communities. 
 
PRAXIS IN PERSPECTIVE 
 John Paul Lederach writes that the challenge of peacebuilding is “to transcend 
what exists while creating innovative responses to the needs the real world presents.”50 
Ultimately, this is exactly what La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo managed to 
do.  Overcoming the fierce social divisions of the time, the Red united to confront the 
socioeconomic challenges of post-demobilization Nicaragua.  Since then, it has evolved 
into an extensive organization with mechanisms to monitor, mold and mobilize its efforts 
according to Nicaragua’s changing reality.  The Red gains this flexibility because it is not 
a solution in and of itself but the means to solutions, first to the challenges of 
reintegration and now, the struggles of the modern day.   
 The failures of the Chamorro government’s “peace efforts” highlight the 
importance of understanding violence in its entirety - bearing in mind its direct, structural 
and cultural manifestations.  The emergence of Recontras and Recompas in post-
                                                 
50 Lederach, John Paul.  The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace.  New York: Oxford  
 University Press, 2005.  86 
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demobilization Nicaragua only proves that taking the arms away from soldiers without 
addressing the underlying attitudes or circumstances that motivate them to take up arms 
in the first place cannot and will not build sustainable peace.  Just as conflicts must be 
resolved, the convictions and circumstances that breed violence must be transformed.  
These solutions must be fluid, able to navigate the ebbs and flows of the ever-changing 
post-war setting.  As La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo demonstrates that 
contingent to the struggle for reconciliation lies the struggle for greater social change, 
with reconciliation demanding and propagating social change and social change 
necessitating and facilitating reconciliation. 
 If violence, as Johan Galtung suggests, is at its core “needs deprivation”, 
responses to violence should consist of avenues through which divided societies may 
unite and address such needs together.51  Peacebuilding, while encouraging the renewal 
of relationships, must also emphasize the discovery and establishment of social spaces 
that would permit such unions to occur.52
 Within Nicaragua, La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo became this space, 
joining Resistencia and Sandinista ex-combatants under the banner of a common cause.  
Relational spaces, according to Lederach, create, maintain and sustain connections 
between conflicting parties by keeping such groups in “creative interaction”.53  By 
providing this means of civic participation, relational spaces serve, not only as 
alternatives to direct violence, but forums in which examples of structural and cultural 
violence may be encountered as well.   
                                                 
51 Galtung, Johan, 43 
52 Lederach, 76. 
53 Lederach, 85. 
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 In Nicaragua, the Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo became the means by 
which desmovilizados could respond to their post-transition frustrations through civil 
rather than military channels, thus discouraging rearmament and further violence.  In 
doing so the Red enabled ex-combatants to discard their military identity and forge a new 
civilian one.  As ex-combatants came to identify themselves as civilians, so too did they 
come to regard their former enemies in the same way.  One Promotor remembered, “they 
weren’t military and nor were we.  We were civilians who needed to reinsert ourselves 
into society…and from there began our transformation.”54
 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
 The reconciliation model presented by La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo 
proved innovative in two major respects.  Besides demonstrating that the reconciliation of 
the present does not require the reconstruction of the past, the experience of the Red 
affirms that ex-combatants are very capable of being both the subjects and the agents of 
the larger peace process.  
Changing the Rules 
 In the field of conflict resolution, there exists the tendency amongst some to 
assign peace with a formula, designating specific steps that “need” to be taken in order 
for reconciliation to be achieved.55  Within such a framework lies the impression that a 
post-conflict society can move on only after it has confronted its recent history of war.  
Before they can reconcile with each other, it is assumed that people first must reconcile 
                                                 
54 Padilla.  Interview.  21 April 2006. 
55 Ortega, viii. 
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with their own proper pasts.  The example of the desmovilizados in Nicaragua, however, 
proved the contrary. 
 During its initial reconciliation workshops the Programa de Educación y Acción 
para la Paz tried to operate under the traditional approach, but 
This attempt to procure pardon and “heal wounds” (supposedly 
the basis of reconciliation) did not give the results hoped. 
The recently demobilized did not want to address the past and, 
much less, “their past”.  Nobody wanted to open the wounds of 
that painful stage. 56
 
What the desmovilizados did want to do was address the social and economic challenges 
of their reinsertion.  Ultimately reconciling themselves during the process of this 
common struggle, their example indicates “that the reassimilation of the past is not a 
precondition, but a product of reconciliation.”57
While completing my research more than fifteen years following their 
demobilization, I still found than many ex-combatants still were hesitant to speak of their 
past.  When I asked about their involvement during the war, they offered me very 
generalized answers and almost always referring to the universal “we” instead of 
speaking individually about themselves.  Rather than “coming to terms” with their past, it 
seemed to me that most of the people that I met had simply come to separate their 
identities then from their identities now. 
In one of my interviews, a Promotor who had fought with the Resistencia recalled 
meeting a Spanish woman at a conference a few years ago who had worked in Nicaragua 
as an internacionalista during the 1980s.  Questioning him about his participation during 
the war, this particular woman was curious to know whether or not he, as an ex-
                                                 
56 Ibid., 35. 
57 Ibid., 47 
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combatant had come to regret his involvement with the Contra.  Upset by this, the 
Promotor made it very clear that he was not at the conference to discuss what had 
happened ten years ago, but rather the work that the Red had completed since then.  “That 




As the history of Nicaragua illustrates,  
In and of themselves, cease-fires, elections and political power-
sharing will not produce democracy and development.  
Institutional arrangements in each country remain fragile, as 
negotiated agreements at the top can rapidly unravel or indeed 
fail to hold much consequence for those at the bottom.  Herein 
lies the importance of promoting peace-building and 
reconciliation from below…59
 
Often treated as “obstacles” to this process, “rarely are ex-combatants perceived as a 
resource, as a promoter or a participant capable of contributing to the definition and 
implementation of a lasting peace.”60  The Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo 
challenged this stereotype, proving that ex-combatants are not only capable but ideal for 
grassroots peacebuilding.  Existing as living and breathing examples that popular 
reconciliation is possible, the peace building efforts of Promotores goes to show that 
“veterans have a special role to play in the rebuilding and transformation of the social 
fabric of divided and devastated communities.”61  Overcoming their stereotype as threats 
to the reconciliation process, the ex-combatants within the Red affirm that soldiers of war 
can become soldiers of peace.  “I have converted from a military person, a person 
                                                 
58 Romero.  Interview.  3 May 2006. 
59 Bendaña,  2-3. 
60 Ortega,  vii. 
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THE TASK AT HAND 
The conditions in which the Red operates today are not all that different from 
those of its founding twelve years ago.   Although the wounds of war are certainly less 
fresh now then they were back then, the prevalence of social and economic injustice has 
only grown.  Nicaragua, today, for all intensive purposes, exists as a nation reconciled, 
yet the Promotores I interviewed maintained this country still lacks a sustainable peace.  
Demonstrating an impressive comprehension of structural violence, members of the Red 
explained that, at present, “there isn’t war, but there isn’t peace.”63  Although Nicaragua 
might feign a relative peace, at its core, “there isn’t social peace, there isn’t a peace of 
equality, there’s a great disparity between your rights and mine.”64   
For Promotores within the Red, the socio-economic problems that modern day 
Nicaragua presents have often proved difficult to address because they are not in the 
people’s hands necessarily, but “the hands of the government authorities.”65  Their 
challenges today far more ambiguous than their challenges of the past, I was eager to 
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learn more about how Promotores, fifteen years following demobilization, responded to 
this reality. 
During the course of my research, I noticed that some common themes 
emerged.  The emphasis that may Promotores placed on the giving and receiving of 
knowledge was inspiring.  The people that I met were hungry to empower themselves and 
eager to impart these lessons learned to others.  One explained, “it’s important that I keep 
learning, that I keep moving forward because, for me, to be a Promotor is the least that I 
can do.66  Two Promotores that I met, not finishing their primary school education 
because of their involvement in the war, were now studying law at the local university.67   
To be a Promotor, one told me, “is to understand the current situation a little 
better…to participate, to keep social problems in mind.”  Besides being socially 
conscious, Promotores felt called to be active members of their communities.  I spoke 
with one city official who mentioned that the members of the Red not only were 
intimately acquainted with the reality of the municipality, but chose to “involve 
themselves in a direct way” within that reality.68
While in Estelí , I actually met one Promotor who literally walks from house to 
house within her barrio, meetings with individual families to discuss the public health 
issues that effect her community. This particular Promotor proceeded to tell me that 
acting within “terreno de fuego”69 was part of her job description. 70 I, of course, use 
“job description” loosely because all Promotores work on a completely volunteer basis. 
                                                 
66 Moreno.  Interview.  30 April 2006. 
67García. Interview 1 May 2006 and Romero. Interview.  3 May 2006 
68 Ramilio Sánchez. Interview.  21 April 2006. 
69 Translates into “land of fire”, but is similar to “the line of fire” 
70 Rosa María Moreno.  Interview. 30 April 2006. 
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Another one of the Promotores I interviewed shared that, during her time with 
the Red, the most important lesson she’s learned is the importance of accepting the things 
that one cannot change and confronting the things that one can.71  In the face of 
Nicaragua’s current socio-economic troubles, there is obviously much that the 
Promotores cannot do.  That being said, I, too, came to see that the Promotores are still 
resolved to do one of the things that they can -  capacitate themselves and fortify their 
communities. 
In his book, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace, John 
Paul Lederach writes that while in Central America he came to appreciate the talent of 
know-who. 
When people in everyday settings where I was working had a 
conflict, their first thought was not “what is the solution?”  It 
was, “who do I know who knows the person with whom I have 
the problem who can help create a way out?”72
 
In their efforts to strength and organize their own communities, I began to understand 
that Promotores are endeavoring to expand their know-who networks.   
Today, Promotores have become “point-people” within their communities, 
knowing the person, who probably knows the other person that can probably help a 
fellow neighbor out.  Having established relationships, not only with fellow community 
members, but also local government and non-governmental authorities, it is in this way 
that Promotores hope to navigate and eventually transcend their current struggles.  
Competing with forces far greater than themselves, the members of the Red maintain that 
they can only face Nicaragua’s current socioeconomic situation as “a people 
                                                 
71 Elba María Altamirano. Interview. 30 April 2006. 
72 Lederach, 77. 
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organized.”73  And so, La Red de Promotores de Paz y Desarrollo, endeavors to confront 
the trials of the future in the same manner it has tackled the challenges of the past, “better 
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